The interest in researching terrorism and the process of radicalisation has significantly increased after devastating events such as 9/11, the Lockerbie bombing in 1988, the London bombing in 2005, and other terrorist attacks that frightened the world and boosted the need for additional measures and systems to combat terrorism. Understanding why groups and individuals become radicalised provides valuable insight into their psychological profile, attitudes, motivations, experiences, and other relevant factors. The data can be used to prevent acts of terror, and the involvement of individuals in terrorist groups. Governments, on the other hand, have the responsibility to take necessary measures to prevent individuals, particularly vulnerable ones such as children and young people, from being radicalised.

         Radicalisation can be defined as a process of inflicting radical views on individuals or groups; these can be in terms of political, social, economic, or any other issues. Radicalisation can be seen as a two-stage process (Chisholm & Coulter, 2017). The first stage encompasses an attitudinal journey, where a vulnerable individual begins to hold and extremist views. The second is where extremist views turn into violent actions influenced by multiple external and internal factors (Chisholm & Coulter, 2017). The knowledge and data on radicalisation stages and individuals at risk are crucial because these provide opportunities to support individuals and families proactively and reactively.

         The essay’s objective is to analyse on micro-levels, the main reasons individuals become radicalised, and how practical is the British Government’s response to the threat posed by radicalisation. First, the discussion centres on reasoning of individual radicalisation and various models existing to project common patterns. Some of these include “three-step models of radicalisation” (Beelmann, 2020),” dynamic model” (Council of Europe, 2016), “psycho-social processes” (Holmer & Bauman, 2018), and other theories. Second, the analysis is is focused on strategies and pieces of legislation used by the British Government to counter radicalisation and terrorism. It critically discusses the (CONTEST) strategy, which comprises four policy strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare (HM Government, 2018).

          The discussion pinpoints major criticism it has concerning British Muslim individuals and acknowledges the importance of strategy, but it does not ignore major challenges and limitations related to it. Thus, some recommendations are provided for making general improvements towards the strategy, particularly for the process of preventing individuals from becoming radicalised. Scholars, authorities, and institutions concerned have discussed a diverse range of factors and motivations that can explain why individuals become radicalised and, from there, possibly commit extremist violence.

While the list of possible reasons is extensive, there haven’t been much attention directed towards deep triggers of radicalisation and extremism. Instead, many institutions responsible for it, superficially attempted to provide solution that seems too beneficial for short term.  A relevant tool increases the chance of designing an effective intervention strategy that could prevent radicalisation and extremists. Based on (Holmer & Bauman, 2018), these tools have evolved and shifted from a linear to a dynamic model, thus, reflecting the complexity of the radicalisation process. Despite, acknowledgment and wide research towards the complexity, these strategies are still not enough to identify and transform the ideologies of individuals at the right time. Delays in the process lead to a very high price putting human lives at stake.

          The dynamic individual radicalisation models point out risk factors, vulnerabilities, and reasoning behind radicalisation and extremism. On the other hand, it is crucial to acknowledge the challenges of using these models to predict which individual will become radicalised or commit violent or non-violent acts. Beelmann (2020) proposes a three-step model of radicalisation; the first step is ontogenetic social-developmental processes, followed by the interaction of societal, social, and individual risk and protective factors. The scholar assumes that these processes are closely linked and are central conditions for radicalisation. Similarly, Angus (2016) implies that social aspects such as identity and social exclusion, a perceived injustice for a community, and limited understanding are among the key motives individuals justify terrorist acts. The new models incorporate a robust understanding of the “psycho-social processes” (Holmer & Bauman, 2018). In terms of the dynamic model, radicalisation presents shifting routes; individuals can enter, exit, or re-enter (Council of Europe, 2016), making it even harder to manage the crisis and choose the right tactics to cluster individuals based on processes suggested earlier.  Managing crisis in this context refers to the ability to identify and plan the resources to anticipate, prevent and terminate threats or acts of terrorism.

        There are multiple pathways through which individuals join violent groups. Gómez (2021) distinguished two; compliance and internalisation; the first occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents, and the second occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. Despite the author, classification it questionable whether individuals use one way or another or even both aspects that is not fully covered and could require further research. Nevertheless, the findings showed systematic differences in why individuals enter violent groups, thus, suggesting that the strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to groups (Gómez, 2021). Each terrorist groups have their own methodologies for terrorism whether it is suicide bombs, hijacking, or application of CRBN attacks, understanding the group objectives, structure and ideology will help forecast the attitudes and future actions its members may show.

          Based on Home Office (2022), there is an extensive list of proscribed international terrorist groups, 78 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorist Act 2000, and 14 in Northern Ireland were proscribed under previous legislation. Extensive research on this organisation in collaboration with international institutions could lead to identification of additional reasons individuals join based on not only their psychological state but also considering other factors such as geographical position and environmental factors.

         Radicalisation and extremism imply various factors, sometimes visible and sometimes hidden, difficult to spot. For example, analysing the motivation of individuals from the same terrorist group may lead to findings of common patterns, whether these are cultural, personal, religious, or political. Nonetheless, external factors like political, economic, and cultural conditions without doubt shape and constrain the individual’s environment; however, it is questionable whether these directly impact individual attitudes (Transnational Terrorism, Security& the Rule of Law, 2008).

        The highest number of terrorist attacks in the UK occurred relatively recently, in 2014, 2015, and 2017 (Statista, 2022), and the worst, with the highest number of casualties and deaths was the downing of “Pan Am Flight 103” in December 1988 above Lockerbie, Scotland. It caused 270 fatalities (Ibid.,2022), then London 7/7 attack with 56 casualties (Ibid.,2022), the Omagh bombing with 29 casualties. The Omagh bombing, organised by the Real Irish Republican Army, was among the most damaging “during the three-decades-long civil conflict known as the Troubles in Northern Ireland” (Sullivan, 2021). Most attacks were related to the troubles in Northern Ireland, while two were linked to Islamic extremism, including the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017. The listing of terrorist attacks has been done to project two different ideologies but with the same intent to kill people and create fear and bring world attention towards it.

           The recruiting agents are said to be choosing their targets carefully. They generally reject former Provisional IRA members, and anybody involved in criminal or illegal activity. In this respect, the Continuity IRA differs from the “Real IRA” group, which carried out the Omagh atrocity in August 1998 (The Irish Times, 2000). Muro (2016) believes that in Northern Ireland, individuals who were joining the group were supporting the ideology of British people to get out, which reflects their feelings of injustice, grievance, and distance devolution towards British nationals. 

       Based on the pyramid of radicalisation, higher levels are associated with decreased numbers but the increased radicalisation of beliefs, feelings, and behaviours. Individuals are drawn into the process by their devotion and commitment to a cause and willingness to give their lives for the organisation’s goals. On the other hand, push factors (burnout, discrimination, loss of faith) determine changes in their attitude towards their membership without direct intervention from the government or other organisations which is somehow a positive occurrence, but not as frequent as wished.

         The reasoning behind individuals joining Islamic extremism is mostly religious fanaticism and belief in religious supremacy. Given the radical views of extreme religious groups, an essential condition for entering is an individual’s readiness to be exposed to the ideology. Prior socialisation experiences heavily influence a priori views of radical groups and thus the likelihood of conscious exposure. Most individuals will reject the movement outright as “extreme,” “fierce,” or “unreasonable”(Wiktorowicz, 2022) but other will stay due to internal and external influences.  However, the crisis can lead to a cognitive awakening and the need to broaden individual views and perspectives, embrace the possibility of different pathways without violence. Nevertheless, suspicion of terrorist groups related to individuals exiting the organisation and the risk of secret exposure can inflict fear and inability to leave the group. 

        As discussed previously, the belief that they are fighting for a cause is among the prominent reasons individuals become radicalised. However, the evolving technology and access to a broader population internationally provide opportunities for terrorist groups to recruit citizens of countries where attacks are planned to be carried. An example is the London bombings (2005), a phenomenon of “homegrown terrorism” Hofmann, (2012), where the attack was organised by three British citizens (Knapton, 2014) which deepens the concern of an increased threats that not only comes from foreigners but also from own citizens. Besides that, other reasons that trigger individuals to become radicalised include the vulnerabilities factors.

         Based on the Centre for Prevention of Radicalisation leading to violence (2022), some of these factors include relational issues, personal and social identity, and psychological and external motivators. Rational issues refer to family disaffiliation, the network of contacts in radical circles, and distance from friends. Personal causes include difficulties in transitions to adulthood, complex life events such as the death of family members, and existential spiritual crises. (Spalek, 2007) argue that most young extremists fall into one of two groups: well-educated undergraduates or those with degrees and technical professional qualifications in engineering or IT, including under-achievers with few or no qualifications and often a criminal record. There is great concern that Islamist terrorists target the poor and jobless among the latter groups and others are radicalised while in prison. The environment in community is a crucial aspect in term of growth or reduced level of radicalisation but is not limited to it.

          Garton Grimwood (2016) stated that a delay in the vital role transitions of getting a job, leaving home, and getting married will affect maturity. Not only that, but also potential catalytic events can affect the mental health of individuals; (Centre for the prevention of radicalisation leading to violence, 2022) therefore, they may see groups as a solution to their feelings and attitudes of isolation. Analysing preconditions such as root causes and proximate causes give an understanding of what challenges individuals are facing and how identifying them can be used by programs of deradicalization to heal them from the roots in order to prevent them from coming up to the surface through violence and terrorist attacks. Despite the presence of a deeper psychological concern for the individuals involved, no reason can truly justify the killings of people. 

         Social identity issues include a sense of being stigmatised or discriminated against one’s beliefs or origin and imposed social isolation. Despite it being among other reasons, it does not necessarily mean that individuals discriminated against will be involved in radicalisation. Psychological motivators are psychological rigidity, episodes of psychological distress, and mental disorders. External motivators include polarised and polarising societal debates, government positioning on poorly understood national and international issues, highly sensationalised public and media discourse, extremist discourse, and propaganda that is readily accessible. 

        Crenshaw asserts that conditions for terrorism can be a lack of opportunity in terms of political involvement “governments that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383). Many examples of individuals from privileged backgrounds have been inspired to turn to violence out of sympathy for a marginal group rather than from direct personal experience (Parker, 2012). Various researchers have attempted to project the motivators and reasoning behind the justification of radicalisation; however, the process is quite complex. It is difficult to determine why some individuals are exposed to the same circumstances, impacted by factors of vulnerability and as a result are pulled into terrorist groups; and others are not. Thus, a definitive view of why individuals become radicalised may not be possible; nevertheless, identifying patterns still help minimising the risks of individuals getting involved.

           To summarise what has been discussed in this section, individuals become radicalised for multiple reasons. Most of the time, there may be more than two reasons combined that could contribute to the individuals being dragged into extremist or terrorist groups. The radicalisation is seen as gradual process and the recruitment agents use persuasion and psychological manipulation to attract new members. The common patterns found in those involved in terrorist attacks include the feeling of fighting for a cause, isolation, social exclusion, a perceived injustice for a community. However, there are cases where there these can’t be easily seen which proves that it is a complex process that requires extensive research, and it is quite unique for each case. Thus, identifying reasoning alone may not be enough to prevent radicalisation but it is a step forward towards deradicalization. Governments must never stop trying to identify potential threats, including the reasoning behind involvement, and apply strategies to minimise the risks.

           The British government set rules and norms, including strategies to respond to threats caused by radicalisation and extremism. They use different approaches based on what stages of radicalisation these individuals are in, whether ideological engagement, radicalisation, level of engagement, and others. This section critically discusses the strategies and pieces of legislation related to it. Also, it covers approaches of the UK government to tackle the causes of individual radicalisation and how successful these tools are in the prevention of radicalisation. According to Parker (2012, p.19), radicalisation is not a division between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ issues. The states also have an essential part in the radicalisation process because of the social structure or lack of funding, support for disadvantaged communities, and individuals prone to radicalisation. Their response and methods used to respond to potential threats and barriers in prevention, the policies adapted can either lead to an increased level of radicalisation or lower it.

          On the other hand, radicalisation is deepened into the roots of society. Without healing the causes and motivators, particularly in the case of homegrown terrorism, the approaches may lack efficiency in the long term. The radicalisation process is not a static phenomenon; thus, it undergoes continuous changes and can transform and take different shapes. The methodologies used for attacks can also change, and the inability to identify new trends and adapt can worsen the situation or make the policies ineffective.

          The UK’s official counter-radicalisation and terrorism strategy, abbreviated CONTEST, is based on four policy pillars: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government, 2018). The government approach intends to connect both sectors, private and public, in order to establish a common ground for prevention by making it the responsibility of all, including communities, citizens, and oversea partners, to recognise and report if potential signs of radicalisation have been identified Sabir (2017,  p. 209). Connecting society towards a common cause can be beneficial. However, it is somewhat questionable how effective is it as these areas require knowledge and skills to avoid wrong judgments and reports.

         The first element of CONTEST is “Prevent,” which is also known as “Prevent Duty,” aimed “to block people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” (HM Government, 2018). It deals with countering the ideology and grievances propagated by terrorists and their alleged supporters through counterpropaganda or ‘hearts and minds’ activity (Sabir, 2017). The second strand,” Pursue,” aims to “stop the attacks” (HM Government, 2018) and subject terrorists to judicial measures. Also, it aims to introduce new counter-terrorism norms that will boost the support for counterterrorism and minimise the threats. The third strand, “Protect,” refers to strengthening the protection against potential attacks by working in partnership with global institutions to enhance the knowledge and capabilities to deal with advanced threats. The last strand is “Prepare,” which aims to reduce the impact of a terrorist attack by facilitating rapid recovery, resilience, and effective response in supporting victims. Hardy, (2015) believes that resilience has become a significant element of the government’s strategies to solve contemporary policy problems.

         The “CONTEST” strategy aims to cover all forms of terrorism, which can create opportunities for improvement but at the same time may lead to specific barriers. Mythen & Walklate (2016) asserted that the range of policies ushered in through “Prevent” has been crucial. However, the Channel Project has been subject to criticism. It implies that workers from different sectors have been mobilised to gather and share personal data related to individuals’ attitudes, appearances, friendship groups, and religious adherence. The purpose is centred on intervention. However, this may lead to reporting erroneous judgment and “incitement of conformist behaviours” (Spalek, 2007). Also, these measures encourage citizens to be accountable for surveillance, particularly for Muslims. Despite the good intention, applying it in practice creates risks for young individuals if the responsible parties are not qualified or express their judgment from a subjective point of view which can lead to conflicts.  

         Similarly, Race & Class (2010) research has shown that there are strong concerns that the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda may be seen as making the whole Muslim population a ‘suspect community,’ fostering social divisions. Another argument against Prevent duty was claimed by Wolton (2017, p.123 ) which has argued that the “Prevent Duty” implies that there is a clear concept of “British values.” However, such a concept is logically opposed to democracy because it is fixed and identifiable. With even a more robust criticism of the government strategy, Coppock & McGovern (2014) stated that counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation strategies safeguarding vulnerable children and young people from extremism are ill-conceived. Furthermore, the service practitioners are responsible for disciplining British Muslim children are responsible for preventing and ameliorating mental health issues; however, it can potentially worsen the situation. Despite various training these may receive, it is still challenging to monitor if the regulations have been followed as advised and practitioners don’t take the matter in their hands thus, doing more damage than good.

         Robinson et al. (2017) have also pointed out that the Prevent approach somehow criminalised vulnerable populations and fostered divisions as Muslims are perceived as potential suspects. This creates dangerous paths for Muslim individuals and the entire community as it drives paranoia and fear. It gives birth to a stereotype that “all Muslims are terrorists,” leading to changes in people’s attitudes towards Muslims, making them even more vulnerable to radicalisation and marginalisation. Nonetheless, an analysis aimed to assess the effects of Preventing Policy finds that Muslims have divided positions; some are fundamentally “anti-prevent and anti-police, “and another group is “pro-prevent”; they advocate preventing and encouraging the application of the program. A larger group has shifting views that are determined by the unfolding events (Innes et al., 2011). 

          The British Government also uses “Stop and Search” powers under Terrorism Act 2000 (British Government, 2011). Officers from forces such as the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police, and the British Transport Police work together on specific crime and terrorist operations that shows a significant reduction in the volume of searches carried out as well as increased arrest rates and reduced complaints (Metropolitan Police, 2022) On the other, hand it can create risks in term of collective legitimacy. Murray et al. (2015) assesses that vulnerability to violent extremism rises, whereas confidence in police falls. Muslim respondents perceived that they are more likely to be stopped and searched than ethnic minority non-Muslims and had much lower confidence in the appropriateness of this power, even when compared to non-Muslim ethnic minorities.

         The ACPO tiered intervention model to address Prevent Chritsmann (2012, p.247) comprises four tiers. The higher level (Actively breaking the law) is associated with an increased level of radicalisation and thus requires an enforcement approach to tackle it. The third tier in the model represents individuals that are moving towards extremism. On this level, an interventionist approach will be applied. In Tier number 2, the vulnerable are targeted, and an approach based on these groups is used; the first tier involves all community members, and a universal approach is applied.

      The evidence shows that, British government and not only use torture strategy to gather information from terrorist which is against Human Rights Law. Blakeley & Raphael (2017, p.244) allegation of British intelligence involvement in torture and prisoner mistreatment which has been denied   despite evidence presented. These types of strategies could be effective on the other hand it damages the image of the institution and leads to other issues.  Without doubt, prisons have been among the most accessible places for terrorist groups to recruit individuals, aspects that couldn’t been ignored by government. It recently announced new tactics to tackle terrorism recruitment which involves separating influential terrorists in separated units and a £6 million expansion of close supervision centres shelters the most violent offenders (Ministry of Justice, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, 2022). Considerable investment by the government has been spotted to tackle radicalisation and terrorism in prisons. Despite government concern and willingness to tackle terrorism, significant decisions in providing practical solutions and investment occur after major disturbing attacks such as (the terror attacks of 2019 and 2020), which are concerning as it is somehow failing to forecast future threats.

           Other measures include strengthening the law, ending the automatic release of terrorist offenders, and implementing more stringent sentences for the most dangerous. Through the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, the government has invested in Counter Terrorist Step Up program, which focuses on reforms on areas such as joint working, rehabilitation, and training. However, as the threat grows, it is crucial to evolve and strengthen “prevent” strategies to ensure the best safeguards are in place to keep people safe.

         As discussed in this section, the British Government has a solid strategy to respond to the threat posed by radicalisation despite limitations identified. The UK’s official counter-radicalisation and terrorism strategy and new strategies to tackle radicalisation of individuals in prison is a great achievement and it is expected to make a difference in combating radicalisation. Nevertheless, it raises questions of its practicability considering that terrorist groups are good at adapting and finding other ways of recruiting individuals.

          There is no evidence indicating a single way or circumstance that pulls individuals towards radicalisation and extremism. Every case is unique; thus, determining those at risk is tricky despite existing signs and patterns. Government must be on continuous alert for potential threats. Also, it must continuously assess the progress and potential developments to use relevant approaches in combating radicalisation and it questionable whether relying mainly on Prevent Duty is appropriate. Terrorist groups possess online tools that make the recruitment process more manageable and the targets much more accessible, which leads to an increased risk of “homegrown terrorism”. It may require a stronger international cooperation and legislation to strengthen the existing strategies and implement new ones based on trends and new phenomena otherwise, it risks being unsuccessful and for the attacks to continue and even increase on levels and scales.

         According to (Muro, 2016), radicalisation is a multi-level process, as indicated by the pyramid model. Hence, a comprehensive strategy to counter radicalisation ought to assess the individual, organisational and societal levels. Considering the variety of causes involved, it is impossible to pinpoint a single reasoning mechanism or terrorist mindset.  Notably, Atran (2003) argues that preventing the radicalisation, particularly of potential suicide bombing requires macro-level solutions as this a common method used widely by terrorist groups and a requires a well-functioning solution that can be achieved only in an international collaboration. Addressing, issues such as pressure and addressing grievances and humiliation and other local strategies can help but it may not prove sustainable unless addressed at a large scale including shifting social, cultural and political situation.  Parker (2012) suggests that the framework provided by human rights law and international humanitarian law can have an important part in assisting the government in responding effectively to terrorist threats.  Beelmann (2020) implies that “Developmental Prevention” can be applied as a relatively unspecific measure to one or more risks or protective factors, which means that by tackling problems that exist in society, whether these are related to mental health, job security, social care, may contribute to a lower level of individuals involved in radicalisation.

         It is also recommended to construct strategies that will mainly focus on changing their attitudes and ideology as result the risks of their involvement are expected to be reduced. Also, it has been observed that reactions and solutions come after significant events, which is relevant but does tackle the root causes and risks for a new, more advanced attack. In addition to that, the criticism of government strategy suggests violations of human rights. Considering that both human security and human rights are equally crucial for a democratic society, prioritising one and ignoring another brings risks of a growing, latent threat that eventually will surface.  

               In conclusion, individuals become radicalised for numerous reasons. There could be more than one reason and pathway behind their involvement. As radicalisation is gradual, the recruiters use various psychological tactics to persuade vulnerable individuals to join their group. The patterns found in those involved in terrorist attacks include the feeling of fighting for a cause, seclusion, social exclusion, and a perceived unjustness for a community. Nevertheless, there are cases where these signs can’t be easily seen, which exhibits the complexity of the process and the need for extensive investigation. 

          Identifying reasoning alone may not be sufficient to prevent radicalisation, but it is a step toward deradicalisation. Governments must never stop attempting to determine potential threats, including the reasoning behind involvement, and use approaches to minimise the threats. The British Government has a solid strategy to respond to the threat posed by radicalisation despite the limitations identified. The UK’s official counter-radicalisation and terrorism plan and new strategies to tackle the radicalisation of individuals in prison is a plausible achievement, and it is expected to make a difference in combating radicalisation.

           Nevertheless, it raises questions about its practicability, considering that terrorist groups are adapting and finding new routes of recruiting individuals. It is recommended for the British Government to constantly assess the progress and potential developments to use relevant approaches in fighting radicalisation. Furthermore, a comprehensive strategy to counter radicalisation ought to consider individual implications along with organisational and societal levels for more heightened efficiency. Preventing and forecasting potential threats is also worthwhile to be one step ahead of a terrorist organisation; a more robust international partnership could be among the fundamental solutions that must be considered to prevent radicalisation and terrorism.

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